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INT'L & COMPARATIVE LA W REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
Moves are afoot in the United Kingdom to alter the way in
which the law approaches criminal responsibility of corporations
whenever someone is killed as a result of corporate activity.
Following recommendations put forward by the Law Commission, 1
the United Kingdom government is working on implementing
legislation creating the new offense of "Corporate Killing."2 The
purpose of the legislation will be to make it much easier for
corporations and their directors doing business in the United
Kingdom - regardless of country of incorporation - to be prosecuted
and punished for manslaughter when the death of employees or third
parties result from corporate activity.
The rationale behind the proposal stems, in part, from a
number of major disasters in and around the United KingdOm, which
have occurred in recent years in circumstances where official
inquiries into their causes have resulted in severe criticism of the
corporations involved.3 However, with one insignificant exception,
none of the corporations concerned or their directors have been
I The Law Commission was established by section 1 of the Law
Commission Act, 1965, as a body charged by statute, with the function of
reviewing the laws of the United Kingdom and recommending potential
improvements.
2 See generally Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter,
Law Commission Report No. 237, Pt. VIII: A New Offence of Corporate Killing
(1996) (hereinafter Law Com. No. 237).
3 Liam Halligan & Robert Rice, New Offense of "Corporate Killing"
Considered Company Responsibility - Disasters Prompt Proposals to Convict
Directors IfNegligence Causes a Death, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Oct. 3, 1997,
at 8 (listing, as well as the 1987 P & 0 European Ferries disaster where 187 people
were killed, the 1987 King's Cross fire in which 31 died, the 1988 Piper Alpha Oil
Platform disaster in which 167 died and the 1988 Clapham rail crash in which 35
died). See also MV Herald of Free Enterprise: Report of the Court, No. 8074,
Department of Transp. (1987) (hereinafter the Sheen Report) (revealing that P &
0 Ferry Lines was operated "from top to bottom in a sloppy manner")
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prosecuted and convicted of manslaughter.4 This has happened
because the current law in the United Kingdom relating to corporate
manslaughter is problematic and does not have a great impact on the
activities of large corporations.
The shortcomings of the current law have been exposed by the
recent disasters in such a way that there is now an increasing
perception in the United Kingdom that deaths resulting from gross
negligence, in the exercise of business activities, are a category of
unlawful conduct which has been neglected by the legal system for
too long. This in turn has led to consideration of the issue of
corporate manslaughter by the Law Commission. In 1996, it proposed
reform of the law by recommending the creation of a Corporate
Killing offense.' In the autumn of 1997, the United Kingdom
government announced its intention to proceed with the proposed
legislation and it is likely that a new law will be in effect within the
next two years. 6
II. BACKGROUND OF THE NEW OFFENSE
The introduction of the new offense of Corporate Killing is
considered necessary by the Law Commission because of the serious
shortcomings ofthe existing corporate manslaughter rules in England.
4 R. v. Kite, 2 Crmi. App. 295 (Central Crim. Ct. 1996) (Eng.) (addressing
the "Lyme Regis Canoe Tragedy" where four children died in a canoeing incident
and the Managing Director and person solely responsible for safety at his canoe
club, was held responsible and sentenced to three years in prison for failing to
adhere to suggested safety guidelines).
5 Law Com. No. 237, supra note 2, at Pt. IX: Summary of Our
Recommendations, para. 11.
6 Halligan & Rice supra note 3. It is likely that the Home Office
Inter-Departmental Working Group that has been considering the Law
Commission's report and possible amendments thereto will report to Ministers
before the end of August 1999, following which there will be a public consultation
process.
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These shortcomings were well illustrated by the abortive attempt to
prosecute P & 0 European Ferries (Dover) Limited (hereinafter P &
0) and several members of the board of directors in relation to the
187 deaths that resulted from the 1987 Zeebrugge ferry disaster,
involving a "roll-on roll-off' car, passenger and freight ferry.7 The
facts surrounding this tragedy were stated in the Law Commission
Report as follows:
The ferry set sail from Zeebrugge [Belgium] inner
harbour and capsized four minutes after crossing the
outer mole .... The immediate cause of the capsize
was that the ferry had set sail with her inner and outer
bow doors open. The responsibility for shutting the
doors lay with the assistant bosun, who had fallen
asleep in his cabin, thereby missing the "Harbour
Stations" call and failing to shut the doors. The Chief
Officer was under a duty as loading officer of the G
deck to ensure that the bow doors were closed, but he
interpreted this as a duty to ensure that the assistant
bosun was at the controls. Subsequently, the report of
the inquiry by Mr. Justice Sheen into the disaster (the
"Sheen Report") said of the Chief Officer's failure to
ensure that the doors were closed that, of all the many
faults which combined to lead directly or indirectly to
this tragic disaster, his was the most immediate.8
The Master of the ferry on the day in question was responsible
for the safety of the ship and those on board. The inquiry therefore
found that in setting out to sea with the doors open he was
responsible for the loss of the ship. The Master, however, had
7 R. v. P & 0 Eur. Ferries (Dover), Ltd., 93 Crim. App. 72 (Central Crim.
Ct. 1990) (Eng.).
8 Law Com. No. 237, supra note 2, at Pt. VIII: ANew Offence ofCorporate
Killing (citing the Sheen Report, at para. 10.9).
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followed the system approved by the Senior Master, and no reference
was made in the company's "Ship's Standing Orders" to the closing
of the doors.
The Senior Master's functions included the function of acting
as co-ordinator between all the Masters who commanded the Herald
and their officers, in order to achieve uniformity in the practices
adopted on board by the different crews.9
The Sheen Report concluded that the P & 0 Ferry disaster
was not the first occasion in which P & O's ships set sail with their
bow doors open."0 In addition, it found that P & O's management had
not acted upon prior reports of similar incidents where bow doors
remained open while at sea." With regard to corporate responsibility
for the accident, the Sheen Report stated:
Full investigation into the circumstances of the
disaster leads inexorably to the conclusion that the
underlying or cardinal faults lay higher up in the
Company (than the Master, the Chief Officer, the
assistant bosun, and the Senior Master). The Board of
Directors did not appreciate their responsibility for the
safe management of their ships. They did not apply
their minds to the question: What orders should be
given for the safety of our ships? The directors did
not have any proper comprehension of what their
duties were. There appears to have been a lack of
thought about the way in which the Herald ought to
have been organised for the Dover - Zeebrugge run.
All concerned in management, from members of the
Board of Directors down to the junior
9 Law Corn. No. 237, supranote 2, atPt. VIII: ANew Offence of Corporate
Killing, paras. 8A5-8.47.
10 Id at Pt. VIII: A New Offence of Corporate Killing, para. 8.46.
11 Id.
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superintendents, were guilty of fault in that all must
be regarded as sharing responsibility for the failure of
management. From top to bottom the body corporate
was infected with the disease of sloppiness. 12
In the face of such strong criticism of P & O's management,
it may seem surprising that the manslaughter prosecution of the
corporation and several of its directors failed abysmally. In essence,
the reasons underlying that failure can be summarized as follows:
(1) No Vicarious Liability. - It is a long
established principle of English common law that, in
general, vicarious liability does not form part of the
criminal law. 3 As a consequence, ithas been difficult
for prosecutors to use criminal conduct of servants of
the company to prove manslaughter against its
directors.
(2) No Principle of Aggregation. - The
court was unwilling to aggregate the conduct of a
number of a corporation's controlling officers - none
of whom would have been individually liable - so as
to constitute in sum the elements of manslaughter.1
4
(3) Principle of Identification. - The
prosecution of P & 0 also revealed that there must be
a link between the acts or omissions of the corporation
and the state of mind and acts or omissions of a
12 Sheen Report, supra note 3, at para. 14.1.
13 Law Corn. No. 237, supra note 2, at Pt. VI: Corporate Manslaughter: The
Present Law, para. 6.8 (citing Huggins 2 Ld. Raym. 1574, 92 Eng. Rep. 518 (1730)
(Eng.)).
14 Id
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director. 5 Thus, for a corporation to be guilty of
corporate manslaughter someone identified as the
embodiment of the company itself must also be
personally guilty of manslaughter. 6 If the link can be
established the crime will be imputed to the
corporation.
Generally, persons identified with a corporation are the Board
of Directors, the Managing Director and perhaps other senior persons
who have authority to control actual operations of the corporation or
part of them. One well known English judge illustrated the
identification principle by likening a corporation to a human body,
stating:
It has a brain and nerve centre which controls what it
does. It also has hands which hold the tools and act in
accordance with directions from the centre. Some of
the people in the company are mere servants... who
are nothing more than the hands to do the work and
cannot be said to represent the mind or will. Others
are the directors and managers who represent the
directing mind and will of the company, and control
what it does. The state of mind of these managers is
the state of mind of the company and is treated by the
law as such.17
Therefore, a corporation cannot be convicted ofmanslaughter
unless a defendant-director was himself/herself guilty of
15 Law Com. No.237, supranote2, atPart VI: Corporate Manslaughter: The
Present Law, para. 6.49.
16 Id.
17 H.L. Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd. v. T.L Graham & Sons Ltd., [1957] 1
QB 159, 172 (C.A. 1956) (Eng.).
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manslaughter. This could not be proven in the P & 0 prosecution as
evidence was not available to prove any of the individual
defendant-directors possessed the requisite degree of foreseeability
in relation to any risk of death or serious injury created by his or her
actions or inaction.
Indeed, the difficulties created by the identification principle
are such that the more diffuse the structure of the corporation, and the
more devolved the powers that are given to semi-autonomous
managers, the easier it will be for corporations to avoid liability under
the current legal regime.
III. WHAT Is BEING PROPOSED?
The Law Commission has recommended that the new offense
of Corporate Killing should hinge on whether there has been a failure
in the management of a corporation's activities. In particular, the
Law Commission states that a corporation is guilty of Corporate
Killing if a management failure by the corporation is the cause or one
of the causes of a person's death "and its conduct fellfar below what
could reasonably be expected of it in the circumstances."'I8
What then will constitute a management failure and when will
such a failure constitute conduct falling far below what can
reasonably be expected? A management failure is defined by the
Law Commission as follows:
for the purposes of the corporate offence, a death
should be regarded as having been caused by the
conduct of a corporation if it is caused by a failure, in
the way in which the corporation's activities are
managed or organised, to ensure the health and safety
of persons employed in or affected by those
18 Law Corn. No. 237, supra note 2, at Pt. VIII: A New Offence of Corporate
Killing, paras. 8.34-8.35.
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activities.1 9
In the absence of further definition, or relevant judicial
comment in other contexts, it is difficult to expand upon the
definition in a useful way. However, applying the definition to a real
example may be helpful in revealing how a management failure can
be defined in practice.
In 1995, a Boeing 737 aircraft operated by an English
scheduled airline was involved in an incident which led
directly to the airline being fined an unprecedented $500,000
even though no loss of life, injury or property damage
occurred. On February 23, 1995 a British Midland Airways
flight from East Midlands Airport bound for Lanzarote
Airport in the Canary Islands was forced to make an
emergency landing thirteen minutes into the takeoff.20 The
aircraft's instruments indicated that each engine had only 11/2
liters of oil which subsequently resulted in a significant loss
of oil pressure in both engines.21 The pilot, Mr. Barney
Reichman, noticed the rapid oil loss. He diverted the aircraft
to the nearest airport, shut down the engines during the
landing roll and successfully landed the aircraft.' A serious
accident was averted because the Captain was closely
monitoring the engine instruments during take-off phase and
because the Captain demonstrated consummate skill in
19 Id at Pt. VIii: A New Offence of Corporate Killing para. 8.35(4).
20 See Harvey Elliott, UK: Holiday Jet AlertAs Engines Run Out of Oil, THE
TIMES (London), Mar. 2, 1995; see also Harvey Elliott, Pounds 150,000 Fine For
Airline That Put Passengers At Risk, THE TIMES (London), July 26, 1996.
21 Id
22 Id
1998-99]
INT'L & COMPARATIVELA WREVIEW
landing the aircraft whilst in a virtual glide.' None of the 183
passengers on board were injured.24
During the previous night the General Electric CFM-56
Engines had been subject to a borescope inspection, an inspection in
which an optical tube is inserted into the engine to look for damage.'
It was discovered that the High Pressure (HP) rotor covers over the
gear box of each engine had not been refitted. The failure of the
ground maintenance teams to replace these rotor covers resulted in
the loss of virtually all oil from both engines during the flight.26
So why had the HP rotor covers not been refitted? Was it an
isolated act of carelessness or was it indicative of some deeper
problem within the airline concerned? The report of the official
investigation into the incident published by the Air Accidents Branch
of the Department of Transport included an extensive analysis of the
event.
27
The report found that the borescope inspections were started
by a Line Engineer who, because he was running a shift short-handed,
eagerly accepted an offer to complete the job from the Base
Maintenance Controller.28 The Controller in turn had his own
23 Id
24 Id
25 Id
26 Id
27 Aircraft Accidents Report No: 3/96 EW/C95/2/3, Report on the incident
to a Boeing 73 7-400, G-OBMMnear Daventry on 25 February 1995, at Synopsis,
Air Accidents Investigation Branch, Department of Transp. (visited Mar. 4, 1999)
<http://www.open.gov.uk/aaib/gobmm.htm#Causes>.
28 Id at sec. 2.3.2(a)-(b).
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manning difficulties.29 However, he was attracted to the job because
of his concern about the impending lapse of his 750 hours borescope
authorisation and the limited opportunities Base Engineering gave
him to keep it current."
At the time of the incident, there was no existing warning
system within the airline to act as a red flag with regard to any
shortage in staffing levels.31 Further, the airline's Procedures Manual
did not define any procedure to cover the transfer of a partially
completed job from Line to Base Engineering.32 At the time of the
borescope inspection handover, the Line Engineer and the Base
Maintenance Controller were satisfied "after a verbal exchange, that
the existing state of the aircraft and the total requirement of the task
were well understood."33 However, subsequent analysis of the facts,
revealed that the Controller did not fully appreciate what had been, or
remained to be, completed.'
The Controller completed the inspection using his own set of
Borescope Inspection training notes - which he knew to be an
unapproved reference that had not been updated and carried a
warning that they should be used for training only.35 The reason the
Controller used own training notes was because he had added
information in them which he used to help determine the size of any
29 Id
30 Id
31 Id at see. 2.3.2(c).
32 Id at see. 2.3.3.
33 Id
34 Id
35 Id at sec. 2.3.5.
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defect or damage he might find inside the engine. 6 As a result of
using a reference source which he knew to be unapproved for a task
with which he was not currently familiar, the Controller made it
virtually certain that he would deviate from the correct practices of
the airline.37 This resulted in the Controller making serious mistakes,
"including failure to fit the BP rotor drive covers and not performing
an engine run which would have revealed the omission".3 In
addition to anticipating any difficulties which might arise in Base
Maintenance work that evening, the Controller also had to deal with
multiple diversions and interruptions.39 This was particularly the case
because of the depleted staff of Base Maintenance Inspection and
absence of Supervisors on duty that night. The Controller therefore
showed bad judgment in taking on the inspections in addition to his
normal work.4 °
After the incident, the airline conducted an internal enquiry
into its engineers practice of conducting borescope inspections. The
enquiry discovered:
... a significant mis-match between the number of
inspections conducted and the number of HP rotor
drive cover 0-rings used, indicating that contrary to
the specific requirements and warnings in the AMM
(Aircraft Maintenance Manual), 0-rings were
routinely being re-used. In addition, a survey of
engineers authorised for borescope inspections
revealed that post inspection engine runs were
36 Id
37 Id
38 Id
39 Id
40 Id. at sec. 2.3.6.
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frequently omitted. This is not only contrary to the
direct requirements of the AMM but its also contrary
to good engineering practice ......
The airline survey of borescope inspection history makes it
clear that the Quality Assurance (QA) department had not identified
the frequent deviations from a procedural approach and failures to
observe requirements of the AMM over a considerable period of time.
42
Some of the QA engineers did not understand their terms of
reference to include a remit to roam the hangars to observe work in
progress as a matter of course, nor were they prompted to do so.
They did not, therefore, create opportunities to observe any
deterioration in adherence to standards or proper practice to put
corrective action in hand.43
[Moreover], . . night shifts tended to be
relatively sparsely manned and it was more likely that
people would be working in a more isolated manner.
Furthermore, not only was there seldom any QA or
Planning available at night, but the presence of any
form of senior management was rare; this situation
gives rise to the potential for a more relaxed and less
procedural environment to develop unnoticed, except
by results.'
It is clear from the above information and official analysis that
the self monitoring system used by the airline, in common with other
41 Id at 2.5.
42 Id at 2.6.
43 Id
44 Id
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airlines, was jeopardised by poor judgment exercised by one person
within a system which, during night-time, was defective in a number
of entirely predictable respects. Whether such a chain of events
would have put the airline at risk in relation to Corporate Killing if
the Captain had not been able to land the aircraft safely without loss
of life (and the offense existed) would depend, according to the Law
Commission's recommendation, on the circumstances against which
the management failure should be judged.45 The ambit of relevant
circumstances is not defined by the Law Commission. Consequently,
in every case, it would be a matter for the jury to decide by balancing
such matters as 1) the likelihood and possible extent of the harm
arising from the way in which the corporation conducted its
operations, weighted against the social utility of its activities and the
cost and practicability of taking steps to eliminate or reduce the risk
of death or personal injury; and 2) the extent to which the
corporation's conduct diverged from practices generally regarded as
acceptable within the industry in issue.
IV. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
A. The Relevance of Foreseeability
Under the new legislation there would not be a requirement
to show foreseeability of the risk of death or serious injury resulting
from an act or omission, whether to a hypothetical person in the
defendant's position or to the defendant itself.' This is because it is
logically impossible to hypothesise a human being as being in the
same position as a corporation. Therefore, it would be meaningless
to enquire whether the risk could be obvious to a corporation.47
45 Law Com. No. 237, supra note 2, at Pt. VIII: ANew Offence of Corporate
Killing, para. 8.36.
46 Id at Pt. VIII: A New Offence of Corporate Killing, para. 8.4.
47 Id at Pt. VIII: A New Offence of Corporate Killing, para. 8.3.
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B. Causation of Death
A defining question with respect to the new legislation is
whether the management failure caused or contributed to the cause of
the death.4" It follows that it would always be necessary for the
prosecution to rebut any suggestion that reasonable doubt exists
which suggests that the death would have occurred irrespective of the
management failure. Therefore, in the airline example mentioned
earlier, it is arguable that practicable steps could have been taken to
ensure that maintenance work was undertaken in accordance with
approved systems of work which were adequately monitored.
C. Employee Negligence
In practice, it is likely that the operational negligence of one
or more or the corporation's employees will be most connected in
point of time with the death.49 For example, the deaths resulting from
the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster could arguably have been
avoided but for the actions of the assistant bosun.
Under existing rules of causation something known as the
stage already set principle would result in the law declining to look
behind an employee's conduct for other persons and corporate bodies
who may have contributed to the employee acting as he did. 0 It
follows, therefore, that whilst employee(s) concerned may be
48 Id at Pt. VIII: A New Offence of Corporate Killing,
para. 8.39.
49 Id at Pt. VIII: A New Offence of Corporate Killing, para. 8.37.
50 Id at Pt. VIII: A New Offence of Corporate Killing, para. 8.38, (citing
ANDREW AS-vORTHi PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 123 (2d ed. 1995); see also
J. H. MuNKMAN, EMPLOYER'S LIABILTrrY AT COMMON LAW ( 11th ed. 1990) and
H.L A. HART & T. HoNoRE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW ch 1 and passim (2nd ed.
1985).
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individually guilty of involuntary manslaughter on the basis of their
gross negligence, corporations, under the current rules can obtain
protection by invoking the 'stage already set' principle."'
However, under the new rules it is not intended that the
employee's conduct will absolve the corporation from liability if the
mistake or negligence that occurred was the result of a management
failure to take precautions to prevent such conduct. 2 The Law
Commission neatly summarises the point as follows:
If a company chooses to organise its
operations as if all its employees were paragons of
efficiency and prudence, and they are not, the
company is at fault; if an employee then displays
human fallibility, and death results, the company
cannot be permitted to deny responsibility for the
death on the ground that the employee was to blame.
The company's fault lies in its failure to anticipate the
foreseeable negligence of its employee, and any
consequence of such negligence should therefore be
treated as a consequence of the company's fault.53
D. Independent Contractors
Normally, the employer of an independent contractor is not
criminally responsible for the contractor's negligence. In the case of
Corporate Killing, the obligations of a corporation will be increased
in that it will -be for the jury to. determine, 1) whether the death
immediately caused by a contractor was attributable, at least in part,
to a management failure of the part of the corporation for whom the
51 Law Com. No. 237, supra note 2, at Pt. VIII: A New Offence of
Corporate Killing, para. 8.39.
52 Id at Pt. VIII: A New Offence of Corporate Killing, para. 8.37.
53 Id
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contractor was working at the time and, 2) if so, whether the "failure
amounted to conduct falling far below what could reasonably be
expected of the company in the circumstances."'
Such a determination would be made by reference to, inter
alia, the nature and gravity ofthe risk, the competence and experience
of the contractor, and the nature of precautions taken.
E. Those Liable to Prosecution
Originally it was proposed by the Law Commission that
individuals could not face a charge of Corporate Killing.5 However,
presently the UK Government wants to include directors as potential
defendants as well, but has given no indication yet as to how the
proposed offense will be extended to accommodate that
requirement." A clue as to how the issue will be treated may lie in
current Health and Safety at Work legislation which provides that
where an offense is committed "with the consent of connivance of, or
having been attributed to any neglect on the part of, any director,
manager... or other similar officer of the body corporate or someone
purporting to act in that capacity, he as well as the body corporate
shall be guilty of that offence ...
F. Those Who Will Be Able to Bring Charges
Currently, there are no restrictions proposed as to who can
54 Id at Pt. VIII: A New Offence of Corporate Killing, para. 8.44.
55 Id at Pt. VIII: A New Offence of Corporate Killing, paras. 8.58 and 8.77.
56 Halligan & Rice, supra note 3, at 8 (On October 2, 1997 Home Secretary
Jack Straw stated there is a "strong argument for considering in detail... laws
which provide for the conviction of company directors were it's claimed that
dreadful negligence by the company as a whole has meant people have died.").
57 Health and Safety at Work Act of 1974 § 37(1).
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bring charges of Corporate Killing.58 Therefore, if the proposals are
brought into force it is likely that both public prosecutions and private
prosecutions by relatives of the deceased will be permitted. Unlike
the U.S.A., private prosecution by individuals are generally permitted
under criminal law. 9 The impact of this on the handling of tortuous
claims is considered later in this article.
G. Potential Penalties
It is envisaged that if a corporation is found guilty of
Corporate Killing it will be liable for an unlimited fine. 0 It is also
proposed that the Court will have power to order that specific
remedial action be taken within a fixed time scale, such remedial
actions and time scales to be determined by reference to the manner
of the corporations failure which resulted in the cause or one of the
causes of the death.61 In addition, it has also been suggested by the
Government that directors and/or senior managers found guilty of
Corporate Killing should themselves face a fine and/or
imprisonment.62
H. Risks Associated With Companies Incorporated Outside the
United Kingdom
It is intended that the proposed offense willbe actionable both
58 See generally the Law Com. No. 237, supra note 2.
59 Section 6(1) Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.
60 Law Com.No.237, supranote2, atPt. VIII: ANewOffence of Corporate
Killing, para. 8.71 and at Pt. VII: Our Provisional Proposal In Consultation Paper
No. 135, para. 7.25; see also Halligan & Rice, supra note 3.
61 Law Corn. No. 237, supra note 2, at Pt. VIII: ANew Offence of Corporate
Killing, para. 8.72.
62 Id. at Pt. VIII: A New Offence of Corporate Killing, paras. 8.34-8.35.
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inside and in certain circumstances outside the United Kingdom if the
fatal accident occurs in a place which English courts have
jurisdiction; namely, England and Wales; on any vessel in territorial
waters; or a British vessel elsewhere; or on a British-controlled
aircraft in flight outside the UK; or on certain oil/gas rigs.'
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the apparently radical nature of the proposed new
offense of Corporate Killing, it seems unlikely that the existing
obligations of corporations and their management to ensure the
safety of their employees and the general public will change
noticeably as a result of the addition of the offense to the statute
books. This is because a Corporate Killing management failure must
not only fall below what could be reasonably expected, but it must
fall far below, with the result that the corporate negligence must be
very serious before a prosecution can have a reasonable prospect of
being sustained.
There can be no doubt, however, the public
approbation/corporate shame likely to result from a prosecution
(regardless of outcome) will be such that few corporations would
wish to go through the experience if they can avoid it. In practice,
therefore, the introduction of the offense is likely to provide a
significant new weapon in the armoury available to those seeking
compensation for death claims after accidents, especially if private
prosecutions are permitted under the new rules, and directors are
exposed to the rigours of Corporate Killing as well. For United
States corporations doing business in the United Kingdom, this means
their ability to resist having to deal with claims on the basis of United
States compensation standards (rather than the lower English
equivalent) will be materially weakened, even though forum non
conveniens defences may remain available to civil suits in their home
jurisdiction. Likewise, once a corporation has been convicted of the
63 Id. at Pt. VIII: A New Offence of Corporate Killing, para. 8.59.
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new offense, there can be little doubt that civil liability lawsuits in the
civil courts will be undefendable.
